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1. Introduction 
 
The idea that “merit” should be the guiding principle of judicial selections is a 
universal principle, unlikely to be contested in whatever legal system. What differs 
considerably across legal cultures, however, is the way in which “merit” is defined. 
For deeper cultural and historical reasons, the current definition of “merit” in the 
process of judicial selections in the Czech Republic, at least in the way it is 
implemented in the institutional settings, is an odd mongrel. The old technocratic 
Austrian judicial heritage has in some aspects merged with, in others was altered or 
destroyed, by the Communist past. After 1989, some aspects of the judicial 
organisation were amended, with the most problematic elements removed. 
Furthermore, several old as well as new provisions relating to the judiciary were 
struck down by the Constitutional Court. However, apart from these rather haphazard 
interventions, there has been neither a sustained discussion as to how a new judicial 
architecture and system of judicial appointments ought to look like nor much of 
broader, conceptual reform in this regard. Thus, some twenty five years after the 
Velvet Revolution of 1989, the guiding principles for judicial selection and 
appointments are still a debate to be had.  
 
This report proceeds as follows. First, since institutional choices with regard to both 
of the key issues tabled by the general questionnaire, judicial selection and lay 
participation in judicial decision-making, are defined by history and prevailing 
ideological convictions present within a legal culture, section 2 of the report starts by 
setting out cultural vision of the judicial function in the Czech Republic that defines 
and helps to explain the institutions and their context addressed in the subsequent 
points. Next, section 3 outlines both, the formal requirements for judicial 
appointments to in particular higher courts in the Czech Republic as well as the 
genuine institutional practice. Section 4 focuses not only on the various forms of lay 
participation in the judicial decision-making processes as they exist today; it also 
explains why the post-1989 Czech judiciary remains reserved with regard to lay 
participation in the judicial process. Finally, section 5 concludes by connecting up lay-
participation with judicial legitimacy, suggesting that judiciary that apparently does 
not trust its citizens can hardly expect much trust in judiciary being displayed by them 
in return.  
 
2. Prologue: the Historical Image of a Judge 
 
The Czech judiciary or more broadly Central European1 judiciaries are built on a 
myth: the myth that judging and deciding cases is a clear-cut analytical exercise of 
                                                          
*
 This paper is forthcoming as the ‘Report on the Czech Republic’ in S Turenne (ed), The Independence 
of a Meritorious Elite: the Government of Judges and Democracy (Reports to the 19th International 
Congress of Comparative Law in Vienna, to be published by Springer in 2015).  
**
 Professor of European Law, College of Europe, Bruges; research fellow, University of Oxford Institute 
of European and Comparative Law. Contact: Michal.Bobek@eui.eu. 
1
 Without wishing to enter the lengthy debate as to what should geographically and culturally mean 
“Central Europe”, for the purposes of this report, the notion “Central European countries” refers to the 
mechanical matching of facts with the applicable law. It is almost “legal arithmetic”. 
Judges do not pass value or moral judgments. They just find (never create) the 
applicable (i.e. already extant) law strictly within the bounds adopted by the 
legislature.  
 
This myth is, to a great part, a variety of the classical narrative concerning the judicial 
function construed on the European Continent in the course of the 19th century.2 
However, whereas the Western Continental countries started gradually departing 
from these assumptions in the course of the second half of the 20th century,3 Central 
Europe did not; quite to the contrary.  
 
After the Second World War in Western Europe, one notes a certain retreat from the 
complete denial of creative power of the judges. In retrospect, denying that judges 
had always exercised some law-making function was referred to, even if in a bit one-
dimensional narrative, as the “French Deviation”.4 However, after the Second Word 
War, the situation clearly changed, amongst other things also with the advent of 
powerful constitutional courts and the various European and international 
jurisdictions. Hesitantly but clearly, Western Continental systems started again 
recognising that judges do create new legal rules, at least to some extent.5 
 
After 1948, the development in the Communist Central Europe, however, went in the 
opposite direction. The legislative (by then the popular people’s) sovereign will was 
put on the pedestal and re-affirmed, against all the institutions in the state.6 Thus, 
instead of re-evaluation and relaxation of the grip of the codes and legal positivism, 
as happened in Western Europe, Communism tied judges even more firmly than 
before. In the visions before the Second World War, Central European judges were 
left with dogmatically limited but still some space of manoeuvre within the law. Under 
Communist rule, there was in practical terms no discretion at all, certainly in the 
cases that mattered politically.7 
 
The pre-Communist judicial authority in Central Europe can be said to be technical 
and bureaucratic. The Austrian-Hungarian judiciary was construed as a skilled 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. There are, naturally, differences between the four 
countries: common past does not guarantee common present. However, because of shared Austrian 
and later Communist heritage, there are arguably some common elements in the perception of judicial 
function present in these four countries.  
2
 Further e.g. JP Dawson, The Oracles of the Law (The University of Michigan Law School, 1968), ch 1 
or J Krynen, L’Etat de justice France, XIIIe–XXe siècle. Tome II: L’emprise contemporaine des juges 
(Gallimard, 2012) 21 ff. For the jurisprudential account of such positivist interpretive ideology, see e.g. B 
Frydman, Le sens des lois: histoire de l’interprétation et de la raison juridique, 3rd edn (Brussels: 
Bruylant, 2011).  
3
 Or, to be precise, they started departing from such official pictures and ideology; the reality might have 
always been different. For a critical discussion see eg: F Berenger, La motivation des des arrêts de la 
Cour de cassation (Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseilles, 2003) or M Gläser, Lehre und 
Rechtsprechung im französischen Zivilrecht des 19. Jahrhunderts (Klostermann 1996), suggesting that 
French higher jurisdictions have in fact never given up their law-making power, even in the times of 19
th
 
century exegesis. They had just hidden it under the surface of the apparent formal legal syllogism.  
4
 Cf the title of chapter ‘IV.’ in Dawson (n 2) 263, as later discussed by other authors, most notably JH 
Merryman, ‘The French Deviation’ (1996) 44 American Journal of Comparative Law 109.  
5
 Further e.g. M Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (Oxford University Press, 
2013) 208-209 and 237-240.  
6
 In constitutional terms, Communist law operated with the notion of unity of state power, not the 
separation of powers. See J Přibáň, ‘Na stráži jednoty světa: marxismus a právní teorie’ in M Bobek et 
al. (eds.), Komunistické právo v Československu - Kapitoly z dějin bezpráví (Masarykova univerzita, 
2009) 39-59.  
7
 For an overview of the day-to-day functioning of the system of “Socialist justice”, see e.g. See 
generally: O Ulč, Malá doznání okresního soudce (68 Publishers, 1974) or I Markovits, Justice in Lüritz: 
Experiencing Socialist Law in East Germany (Princeton University Press, 2010). 
professional career judiciary, an apolitical body, whose authority was expertise-
based. The mandate of the judge was derived from his technical legal knowledge, 
acquired and tested in mandarin-like entrance examination and further fostered in 
similar style of promotion and advancement. 
 
Such expertise-derived authority restrained and protected the judge at the same 
time. The judge was not called to judge the others because he would be anything 
better in moral or ethical terms. The judge was called to judge the others because he 
knows the law, meaning he has the technical knowledge of the codes, the acts of the 
Parliament, the practice of the higher courts and the respective procedures to be 
followed.  
 
In terms of their institutional organisation and culture, the Czech and Central 
European judiciaries are a clear cut example of the hierarchical ideal of officialdom.8 
This ideal is characterized by a professional corps of officials who are organized into 
a hierarchical structure. The system relies on extensive control and oversight of 
activities of the system’s lower levels. 
 
The Austrian and perhaps more broadly Germanic specificity within the hierarchical 
model is the strong bureaucratic element in it. The Austrian monarchy created and 
the Central European countries later inherited the image of the judge as a specific 
variety of a civil servant. It is not without symbolical significance that, if one opens an 
early codification of the organization of courts in the Austrian Monarchy, the 1896 
Law on Courts,9 the law does not call a judge a “judge” [Richter]. Instead, § 1 of the 
Law specifies that the constitutional functions of a judge are to be exercised either by 
“independent judicial officials” [selbständige richterliche Beamten] or “auxiliary judicial 
officials” [richterliche Hilfsbeamte].  
 
However, in the Austrian perception, to be a “(judicial) civil servant” had a distinctly 
positive ethos. The departure from this heritage comes with the Communist regime. 
In a way, the new Communist regime had no problem embracing the idea that judges 
are “civil servants”, serving the “public”. It was a good starting point for turning them 
into genuine servants of the system, which are there to realize greater aims of the 
system. The only necessary step was to redefine the “public”, whom the judges were 
supposed to serve.10 
 
The new characteristics the Communist regimes added to the Central European 
judicial self-image are predominantly negative ones. Perhaps the most important 
ones amongst them was the suppression of personal courage, activity, and 
responsibility. The reasons for promoting such characteristics within a system which 
punishes any positive deviation and within which the most useful survival strategy 
was to be “a grey mouse” or a “faceless official” are obvious. The promotion of such 
personal characteristics within the judiciary was, however, not just the issue of 
political control. The incentives were also of economic nature. Under the Communist 
rule, the position of a judge was badly paid – the average judicial salary in the 
Czechoslovakia, as well as in Poland, Hungary or Eastern Germany, was at or below 
                                                          
8
 MR Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority; A Comparative Approach to the Legal 
Process (Yale University Press, 1986) 16. 
9
 Gesetz vom 27. November 1896, womit Vorschriften über die Besetzung, innere Einrichtung und 
Geschäftsordnung der Gerichte erlassenwerden, RGBl. 217/1896. 
10
 As aptly pointed out by Otakar Motejl, former Czech Chief Justice and then Minister of Justice, this is 
why the new Communist rulers in 1948 in the then Czechoslovakia happily kept the system of 
administration of courts inherited from pre-WWII but in fact already Austrian times – cf. O Motejl, 
‘Soudnictví a jeho správa’ in Bobek et al. (n 6) 813. 
the average salary in the national industry.11 It is clear that, in addition to all the 
political aspects of the judicial work under the Communist rule, a profession with low 
societal prestige and minimal salary was unlikely to attract top candidates to join its 
ranks.  
 
The judicial self-image which emerges after the fall of the Communist rule in the 
Czech Republic and Central Europe more broadly is thus the image of judge as a 
type of civil servant with an implicitly defensive connotation. Instead of the older 
Austrian “I AM a civil servant” comes the post-Communist defensive “I am BUT a civil 
servant”. The Central European judicial Hercules12 seems to be an anonymous grey 
mouse, hidden behind piles of files and papers, unknown to the outside world, who 
does not wish to appear to take any contentious individual decision, surely not those 
s/he would have to defend publicly.  
 
After 1989, the judicial self-image of judging as a mere technocratic and bureaucratic 
activity experiences a certain revival. In a way, the old Austrian approach is very 
useful for the self-justification of the Communist judges and the continuation of their 
career under the new system. Any new political regime faces similar set of questions 
relating to institutional transition. Within the judiciary, the question is: what to do with 
the judges of the old system? The problem is not with the exposed few, the openly 
discredited judges who presided over criminal cases in heavy-weight political trials. 
These typically leave by themselves or they are disposed of. The real problem is with 
the grey masses of system servants, who did not expose themselves in any 
significant way, but were nonetheless clearly loyal to the previous system. They were 
educated and formed under it, they enforced its values.  
 
This issue arises in any judicial transformation. To replace almost the entire judicial 
staff,13 as was to a great extent done after the German reunification with the 
importation of judges from the former Bundesrepublik into East Germany, is a unique 
historical opportunity which was not available in any of the other post-Communist 
states. To train and quickly put into place an entirely new corps of judges is a task so 
enormous that the Communists themselves failed to put it into operation after their 
take-over in 1948.14 
 
All the judiciaries in the post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe were thus, 
basically out of necessity, build on the principle of personal continuity.15 The former 
Communist judges would invoke the myth of moral-free judging by technocratic 
judicial officials as a sort of self-justification for their continuous existence within the 
                                                          
11
 Z Kühn, Aplikace práva soudcem v éře středoevropského komunismu a transformace Analýza příčin 
postkomunistické právní krize (C. H. Beck, 2005) 72-73.  
12
 See, for further elaboration of Dworkin’s figure of the (ideal) judge Hercules, e.g. F Ost, ‘Jupiter, 
Hercule, Hermès: Trois modèles du juge’ in F Ost, Dire le droit, faire justice (Bruylant 2007) 33–60.  
13
 Or, perhaps, to dispose of them in a more drastic way, as was suggested by a senior English judge. 
When asked, what should the Central European states do at the beginning of their transitions in 1990, 
his answer was “Hang all the judges!” – In Z Tůma, ‘Soudce nelze novelizovat’ in I Pospíšil  M Kokeš 
(eds.), In dubio pro libertate. Úvahy nad ústavními hodnotami a právem. Pocta Elišce Wagnerové u 
příležitosti životního jubilee (Masarykova univerzita, 2009) 247.  
14
 For instance, in Czechoslovakia in early 1950s, Communists established so-called “Law Schools for 
Workers” [Právnické školy pracujících]. In these special evening schools, opened only to Communists 
cadres, Communist Party bred “new type of socialist lawyers”. The course lasted one or two years and it 
equalled a university degree in law. The applicants did not even need to have secondary school 
education. The project itself was, however, discontinued after 4 years in 1954 – the quality of the 
“graduates” from these courses was apparently too terrifying even for the Communist planners. Further 
see Z Krystufek, ‘Komunistické právo v Československu’ in Bobek (n 6) 931-951.  
15
 For further discussion of the array of problems this still generates today, see the individual 
contributions in M Bobek (ed), Central European Judges under the European Influence: The 
Transformative Power of the EU Revisited (Hart Publishing, 2015).  
judiciary.16 If push to the extreme, a good judicial official is able to work in any 
regime, irrespective of its internal values, precisely because s/he claims that all s/he 
is doing is the technical application of the will of the legislator. “Mechanical” legal 
science and technocratic knowledge of the law (especially the procedural rules, 
which are, in the most post-Communist states, tend to be the object of a specific cult 
– precisely for these reasons) is thus a judicial self-portrait which an immediately 
post-Communist judiciary cares very much to foster. It helps it to survive and justify 
oneself. 
 
In sum therefore, the surviving image of a judge within the Czech judicial system that 
still informs the judicial selection is quite far from debates on the degree of social or 
community diversity. In this regard, the overall issues and debate are distant from the 
themes emerging in the Anglo-American driven debates on judicial selections and 
appointments. For historical reasons, merit has been defined as technocratic 
knowledge of the law. Thus, the up-to-date ways of selecting judges have focused on 
how to test the knowledge, coupled with technical skills perhaps (judgments drafting, 
conducting proceedings in open court, and so on). Conversely, to test values, 
opinions, convictions would be outside of such merit definition.  
 
For similar reasons, there has been virtually no debate on community diversity or 
representation in both, judicial selections and judicial decision-making. Again, if the 
business of judging is a technical, expert exercise, then lay persons can neither test 
the competence/skills of judges-experts, nor contribute much to such expert decision-
making. There is some lay participation in both, judicial appointments (the 
contribution of the political powers within the state, the government and the president 
of the republic) as well as judicial decision-making (the limited participation of lay 
persons in first instance judicial decision-making). However, these are more of 
exceptions which do not question the prevailing image and self-portrait.   
 
Apart from the cultural tradition outlined above, there are also two factual 
circumstances that have accounted for the fact that the judicial diversity discussion 
that dominate much of the Anglo-American debates are of limited relevance in the 
Czech context. First, the population of the Czech Republic is very homogenous, with 
some 95% of all residents being ethnic Czechs.17 Thus, the issues of the diversity of 
the judiciary, which might be topical in a number of other European countries today, 
with significant cultural, ethical, or other minorities, do not arise. Second, because of 
“imposed equality” in the Communist times as well as low salaries and social 
prestige, judiciaries in Central Europe, including the Czech Republic, tended to be a 
female profession. Thus, in spite of the balance redressing itself over the years, still 
in 2000s, over 60% of judges in the Czech judicial system were women.18 For both of 
                                                          
16
 While down-playing the fact that within a totalitarian Communist state, the ideology and the ideological 
application of the law was omnipresent, not limited to just criminal trials. Thus, in a system of ‘class-
conscious’ judging, it mattered also by whom a normal civil or administrative claim was brought. For 
example, a divorce and/or a child care dispute would be resolved very differently if the opposing parties 
were in one case two members of the Communist Party or, in another, a Party member and, by 
whatever game of chance, a dissident. For case examples, see Ulč or Markovits (n 7).  
17
 According to the 2011 population census data made available by the Czech Statistical Office at 
http://www.scitani.cz, tables No. 111 and 153.  
18
 Z Kühn, ‘The Democratization and Modernization of Post-communist Judiciaries’ in A Febbrajo and W 
Sadurski (eds.), Central and Eastern Europe after Transition (Ashgate, 2010) 178, 191. However, it 
should be noted that the “female majority” in the judiciary is unequally spread. Whereas at the lower 
courts, majority of judges are likely to be female, the ratio becomes reversed at higher and the supreme 
level. Thus, the male-female ratio at the Czech Constitutional Court, Supreme Court and Supreme 
Administrative Court is on average around 2:1. This has not been, however, at least so far, identified as 
a problem that ought to be addressed in any structured way.  
these reasons, issues of diversity are not really being discussed in the Czech 
context.  
 
3. Judicial Selection 
 
The cultural and ideological starting points, outlined in the previous section, find their 
reflection in the institutional and legal provisions governing the judicial selection to 
the higher courts (appellate and supreme) in the Czech Republic. Traditionally, the 
process has been a closed one, lacking transparency and with limited public 
participation. Recently, however, there have been limited “inroads” into this closed 
world of judicial appointments.  
 
3.1. Judicial Hierarchy 
 
First, the structure of appellate and supreme courts ought to be outlined. The Czech 
Republic has, since 2003, a bifurcated judicial hierarchy, consisting of courts of 
general jurisdiction (civil, commercial, and criminal) and administrative courts. The 
courts of general jurisdiction form a four layer (but three instances) system of: 
(i)  District courts; 
(ii)  Regional courts; 
(iii)  High courts; and 
(iv)  the Supreme Court. 
 
The administrative justice has been grafted onto this system in the form of an 
institutional compromise in 2002. Today, administrative courts consist of: 
(i) regional courts; and 
(ii) the Supreme Administrative Court.  
 
Regional (administrative) courts are, however, not institutionally separate. 
Specialized administrative chambers within ordinary regional courts act as 
administrative courts of first instance. Against their decision, a cassational complaint 
may be heard before the Supreme Administrative Court, which is a separate, free-
standing institution. Thus, the Czech judicial system resembles a beast with two 
heads, which is tweaked only at the very top, consisting of the Supreme Court and 
the Supreme Administrative Court, but sharing the same basis of regional courts. 
 
Judicial appointments to the appellate and supreme level include judicial selections 
to the regional courts, high courts, Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative 
Court. Furthermore, dogmatically beyond but functionally above both supreme courts 
is the Constitutional Court. On the one hand, the Constitutional Court insists on not 
being part of the courts of general jurisdiction, but forming a unique jurisdiction of its 
own. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court is entitled to hear individual 
constitutional complaints, modelled on the German Verfassungsbeschwerde. This 
means that the Constitutional Court is entitled to hear appeals against last instance 
decisions of any Czech court. Moreover, nobody was ever able to define a 
“constitutional law question” as opposed to an issue of “mere legality”, i.e. to define 
the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court on constitutional complaints ratione 
materiae. For all these reasons therefore, the Constitutional Court is in fact the 
supreme court within the Czech legal system.19  
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 Further see Bobek (n 5) 157-162 and 265-272.  
3.2 Eligibility 
 
The basic eligibility criteria for all judges of ordinary courts (general as well as 
administrative jurisdiction) are the same. The candidate must be: 
(i) of Czech citizenship; 
(ii) possess full legal capacity; 
(iii) without a criminal record; 
(iv) of at least 30 years of age at the date of appointment; 
(v) a successful graduate of a five years full study of law (Masters) at a Czech 
university; 
(vi) have successfully passed judicial examinations; 
(vii) a person whose experience and moral characteristics guarantee due 
performance of the judicial office.20  
 
All judges appointed to whatever court must meet these basic criteria. In order to 
advance to an appellate or one of the supreme courts, the candidate must meet 
additional criteria of: 
(i) length of legal practice21    
 at least 8 years of legal practice for the appointment to a regional22 or 
high court (i.e. to the appellate level); 
 at least 10 years of legal practice for the appointment to a supreme 
court (i.e. to the Supreme Court or the Supreme Administrative Court);  
(ii) high level of erudition and demonstrated legal expertise.  
 
It is clear from the listed appointment conditions that most of them are “technical” in 
their nature, not evaluative. The only evaluative criterion is the requirement of 
“experience and moral character” and “high level of erudition and demonstrated legal 
expertise”. The latter requirements are, however, nowhere fleshed out in a greater 
detail. For a number of years, the character-related elements of a candidate have 
been reduced to the psychological, personal testing of judicial candidates.23 The 
candidates were obliged to answer a number of standardized and/or open-ended 
psychometric testing questions. Their answers were compared with the standardized, 
expected answers with respect to a norm group. On the basis of such testing, the 
candidates were either recommended or non-recommended for a judicial 
appointment.  
 
The problems of such tests were multiple. The most problematic one was the fact 
that such testing weeded out any candidate whose answer would not correspond 
with the average norm group. In this way, not only perhaps unsuitable candidates 
were excluded, but also those above average, who reacted in less conventional way 
to a set of standardized questions to which standardized answers were to be given, 
or saw different things when presented with various blurred pictures or shapes that 
were supposed to invoke certain types of visual associations. Recently, following a 
sustained critique of such testing, the result of the testing became indicative only. 
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 Conditions are listed in § 60 of the Act no 6/2002 Coll., Law on Courts and Judges, as amended 
[zákon č. 6/2002 Sb., o soudech a soudcích].  
21
 § 71 of the Law on Courts and Judges. 
22
 § 121 of the Code of Administrative Justice [zákon č. 120/2002 Sb., soudní řád správní] contains 
differentiated provisions with respect to the candidate to be appointed to regional courts to sit in the 
specialised administrative chambers as administrative judges of first instance. It sets the required length 
of legal practice at only 5 years, taking into account that those judges act as first instance judges in 
administrative matters, although formally attached to the regional (i.e. in general appellate) courts.  
23
 Introduced by a Ministry of Justice’s circular of 4 December 1992. Further see J Kocourek  J 
Záruba, Zákon o soudech a soudcích; Zákon o státním zastupitelství (2
nd
 ed., C. H. Beck, 2004) 227-
230.  
Although the psychological testing of judicial candidates still continues, the candidate 
may be nominated also in spite of a negative test outcome.  
 
The practice of bluntly equating the only evaluative criterion with psychometric  
testing and making it a compulsory condition for a judicial appointment demonstrates 
a two-fold problem. First, in career judiciaries, appointment of young candidates to 
the bench for life without them having any previous professional track record will 
always mean, in a way, placing a bet on the character of the candidate. Second, to 
this adds the uneasiness that transforming society have with the notion of good 
character and, on the whole, with morality in the public space and office. On the one 
hand, what constitutes a “good character” is not a theme many people in power in a 
transforming society are ready to discuss. The reasons for this are obvious: in a 
judiciary based on the principle of personal continuity, the pre-1989 judges might not 
feel the necessary moral authority for defining such standards and advocating them 
publicly, since their own personal history might not be without past stains. On the 
other hand, once such a criterion for a judicial office has been established by the 
legislator, it needs to be filled with some content. Thus, instead of being evaluated on 
case by case basis with regard to individual candidates, what such categories and 
criteria would inevitably require, “character” and “morality” become psychometric 
categories better be ‘left to the experts’. Incidentally, the issue of psychometric 
testing also indirectly but neatly describes the de facto desired “judicial standard” for 
new judges: nobody too deviant, in the negative but perhaps also in the positive 
sense.  
 
After having listed and outlined the formal, statutory criteria for judicial appointments, 
it becomes clear that the list of criteria for judicial appointments is somewhat basic 
and rudimentary. Selections made solely on its basis would be quite difficult: there is 
no doubt always more interested candidates who meet all the technical criteria than 
there are free judicial offices. In face of such reality, it becomes apparent that what 
matters are the criteria beyond the criteria and the appointments procedures that are 
supposed to apply the criteria. Both of them will be discussed further on.24 
 
At this stage, it should be underlined that on their face, the above listed formal criteria 
are “background blind”. Thus, any qualified lawyer with the required professional 
examination and length of practice might become a judge at whatever level of judicial 
hierarchy, including the supreme level. The criteria speak of the “length of legal 
practice”, not of the length of “judicial practice”. In practice, however, only judges that 
already sit in the first instance courts advance, after the appropriate time, to the 
appellate or supreme level. There are just isolated exceptions to this iron rule of a 
career judiciary, which conceives of advancement in the judicial hierarchy as a type 
of promotion, based on merit and reserved generally to the immediately lower 
echelon of judicial hierarchy.  
 
For the initial judicial appointments, the Czech judiciary would clearly voice a 
preference for appointments to first instance courts from within the ranks of judicial 
trainees, not other legal professions. Judicial trainees have traditionally been fresh 
law school graduates, who are hired by a court for the duration of their traineeship (3 
years of full-time work in the courts, essentially working as a law clerk). If they pass 
judicial examinations successfully and their meet all the other eligibility criteria listed 
above for the judicial office, they may be appointed to a vacant judicial office. A 
distinct judicial preference for ‘in-house’ schooled candidates for vacant judicial 
offices tends to be publicly advocated by suggesting that such candidates, having 
followed the appropriate formation and practice in the courts, are well-prepared and 
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 Below, section 3.3. and 3.4. of this report.  
genuinely ‘ready’ to take on a judicial office. Be it as it may, it is also quite clear that 
in sociological terms, if internal candidates are appointed to a judicial office, the 
judicial ‘in-breeding’ cycle becomes complete: it produces career judges who have 
never in their life worked anywhere else than within the judiciary, sometimes even 
within one and the same court. 
 
The only notable exception to the preference for career judicial appointments and 
advancement in the past years has been the Supreme Administrative Court and its 
composition. Within the same eligibility criteria as those general ones listed above, 
the Supreme Administrative Court sought, since its establishment in 2003, to be 
composed of a more diverse judicial body in terms of professional background of its 
judges.25 Approximately half of its judges came from outside of the career judiciary, 
from legal academia, higher civil service, and from the private practice. In September 
2012, the president of the Supreme Administrative Court, acknowledging and further 
entrenching this practice, published a Memorandum on the Selection of Candidates 
for Judicial Office at the Supreme Administrative Court.26 The Memorandum sets out 
a number of additional and “soft” criteria to those officially listed above that the 
candidate for judicial office at the Supreme Administrative Court should meet. They 
include: 
 
 personal qualities and character (moral integrity; objectivity; courage, sound 
judgment, humility, decisiveness, ability and readiness to further study and 
personal development); 
 intellectual capacity (general legal erudition, high level of knowledge in the 
area of public law; ability to quickly absorb and analyze information; 
independent thinking); 
 empathy and fairness (ability to respect every individual without regard to her 
background; ability to listen patiently; courtesy and civility); 
 authority and communication skills (ability to generate respect and trust; 
ability to maintain authority even in face of challenges; ability to clearly and 
concisely explain the procedure and decisions to all parties and other 
persons); 
 work-place efficiency (ability to work in a speedy way and under pressure; 
time management; ability to draw up clearly reasoned opinions; constructive 
cooperation with other judges within a panel and within the court at large; 
leadership and ability to educate legal secretaries; managerial skills).  
 
The outlined Memorandum is a proclamation of the court’s president without any 
binding legal status. It represents, however, the first visible and serious attempt by 
the senior Czech judiciary to set out a more nuanced criteria as to who ought to be 
eligible to hold a judicial office at the supreme level, that would give information 
beyond the (for this type of appointment rather empty) official legal criteria stated in 
the law.  
 
Finally, the eligibility criteria for the office of the justice at the Constitutional Court are 
provided for separately, in Article 84 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic. Art. 
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 The difference in the composition of the judicial body of the Supreme Administrative Court may be 
traced back firstly to slightly different wording of the § 121 s. 2 of the Code of Administrative Justice that 
in contrast to the general provisions applicable to the courts of general jurisdiction is more explicitly 
open to appointments to the Supreme Administrative Court from outside of the judicial hierarchy, but 
second, and no doubt more importantly, to the personal conviction of the first president of the Supreme 
Administrative Court, Mr. Josef Baxa, that a supreme court ought to be a diverse institution that reaches 
outside the career judiciary, and his willingness to put that conviction into practice.  
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 ‘Memorandum o výběru kandidátů na soudce pro Nejvyšší správní soud’ of 25 September 2012, 
accessible online at www.nssoud.cz. 
84 (3) states that “Any citizen who has a character beyond reproach, is eligible for 
election to the Senate, has a university legal education, and has been active in the 
legal profession for a minimum of ten years, may be appointed a Justice of the 
Constitutional Court.” To be eligible for election to the Senate signifies, most 
importantly, to be at least 40 years old.  
 
3.3. The Appointment Process 
 
All judges are appointed by the president of the republic. The appointment process 
for new judges is a multi-layered process. As most new judges are appointed to first 
instance courts, the initial step is typically done by the president of a regional court 
within whose circuit there is a vacancy at a district court. The president of the 
regional court suggests suitable candidate(s) to the Ministry of Justice. The minister 
of justice has the power to retain or reject a candidate. From those candidates 
retained, the Ministry of Justice draws up, typically twice a year, a list of candidates. 
As appointment of judges is a power for the exercise of which the president of the 
republic need the consent of the government (so called “countersignature” by the 
prime minister or the respective member of the government),27 the list of candidates 
is then forwarded to the government of the Czech Republic. Once the government 
agrees with the list, the candidates on the list are appointed28 by the president of the 
republic.  
 
Once a judge has been duly appointed through the procedure outlined above and 
has taken the judicial oath, s/he can be transferred (re-assigned) within the entire 
judicial system with relative ease. The move to a higher court or to a different court at 
the same level of the judicial hierarchy is seen as a re-assignment of a judge, not a 
new appointment.29 The re-assignment is carried out only within the judiciary, by an 
decision of the minister of justice, with the consent of the judge concerned and the 
president(s) of court(s) in question. 
 
Thus, when speaking of judicial appointment to the appellate and supreme level in 
the Czech Republic, it should be born in mind that the vast majority of appellate and 
supreme courts’ judges were not newly/specifically appointed to that court, but 
internally promoted (re-assigned) within the judiciary. In the Czech Republic, with the 
exception of the Supreme Administrative Court,30 there is technically speaking very 
little direct appointment to appellate and supreme level.  
 
This brings about a striking absence of any public debate, not to speak of scrutiny, as 
to who and how ought to and will be sitting at a supreme court or at appellate courts. 
Any criteria, with the recent exception of the Memorandum of the President of the 
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 Art. 63 (1) (i) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic.  
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 The question of marginal interest for the purpose of this report but of considerable constitutional 
significance in general was whether or not the president of the republic may refuse to appoint a judge 
who has been approved by the courts presidents, the Ministry of Justice, and proposed by the 
government. The Supreme Administrative Court decided that the President may, under certain 
conditions, refuse a candidate. But the grounds are limited and reasons must be stated. Cf. judgment of 
the Supreme Administrative Court of 27 April 2006, Case 4 Aps 3/2005-35, published as 905/2006 Sb. 
NSS [Collection of the Decision of the Supreme Administrative Court]. Further see M Bobek, ‘The 
Administration of Courts in the Czech Republic: In Search of a Constitutional Balance’ (2010) 16 
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 Above, section 3.2. 
Supreme Administrative Court,31 which is applicable, however, only and exclusively 
to the Supreme Administrative Court, i.e. in quantitative terms a tiny fraction of the 
higher Czech judiciary, are virtually unknown. The enigmatic expression of “high level 
of erudition and demonstrated legal expertise”, the only legally stated criterion to the 
appointment to the appellate/supreme level, tends to be reduced to “holding the 
proper line” at the lower echelons of the judicial hierarchy, i.e. writing good 
judgments, not having too many reversals on appeal/cassation, and being on the 
whole an adaptable and likeable person. The entire process is carried out only 
internally, within the respective court and in coordination with the Ministry of Justice.  
 
Candidates for appointment (re-assignment) to appellate/supreme courts are 
additionally tested “in-house” at the appropriate court to which they may be 
potentially promoted. If considered a suitable candidate for a higher judicial office, a 
judge will be invited by the president of a higher court (appellate/supreme) for a 
secondment (stage) within the higher court. Such a candidate will be, again in 
agreement with the Ministry of Justice, seconded to the higher court for a period of 
typically six months up to one year. In the course of the secondment, the lower court 
judge sits as a (full) member of the higher jurisdiction. At the end of the secondment, 
s/he will be evaluated by the president(s) of chamber(s) s/he sat in. Upon their 
recommendation, and again with the consent of the presidents of courts involved and 
the Ministry of Justice, a lower court judge will be either promoted (re-assigned) to 
the higher court or sent back to his/her original court.  
 
Finally, the appointment to the Constitutional Court follows a completely different 
path.32 It is a more political appointment in nature: the president of the republic 
proposes candidates for the office to the Senate (the upper chamber of Parliament). 
If the Senate agrees, the president of the republic may appoint the candidate. 
Naturally therefore, the composition of the Constitutional Court and the profiles of the 
justices are much more varied: majority of them, in the past as well as today, were 
not previously judges at ordinary courts, but academics, former politicians, and civil 
servants.33  
 
In sum therefore, there is a bifurcated or a two channel system of appointments: 
direct and indirect. Direct appointments of new judges are almost exclusively limited 
to first instance courts. Conversely, appellate and supreme courts are staffed nearly 
entirely by the way of “indirect appointments”, i.e. by promotions within the judiciary. 
These are, however, formally no appointments, but mere re-assignments within the 
existing judicial body, as the candidate is already a sworn-in and sitting judge.  
 
3.4. The Appointment Practice and Problems 
 
The appointment process outlined in the previous section still largely reflects the 
notion of the judiciary as a sealed-off cast of independent ‘civil servants’.34 It was 
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 The Czech Constitutional Court was established in 1993. The inspiration for selection and 
appointment of its justices, as well as the its composition and powers, were apparently drawn from 
several sources, including the 1920 Czechoslovak Constitution, the German Grundgesetz, with some 
further inspirational infusions from the United States’ Constitution. Further e.g. T Němeček, Vojtěch 
Cepl. Život právníka ve 20. století (Leges, 2011).  
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 For a critical discussion of this process which led to the formation of the so called “Second” 
Constitutional Court in English see Z Kühn  J Kysela, ‘Nomination of Constitutional Justices in Post-
Communist Countries: Trial, Error, Conflict in the Czech Republic’ (2006) 2 European Constitutional Law 
Review 183. 
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 In the sense of the Austrian mental heritage outlined above in section 2. Of course, all judges are 
appointed for life with constitutional guarantees of their tenure.  
inherited from the times of Austrian monarchy and not altered much during the 
Communist rule in terms of the institutional model. It was naturally, as many other 
things, completely hollowed out internally between 1948 and 1989, but the 
institutional façade remained.  
 
The same institutional set up continues after 1989. In the 1990s, it was not much 
attacked or contested, for a simple reason: the judiciary as a profession kept being 
unattractive and there were only few candidates. Most of lawyers at the time went 
into private practice. The situation changed in early 2000s due to two factors. First, 
with the private practice filling up quickly, being an attorney ceased to be an ‘easy 
bonanza’, as in 1990s. Second, with the rise of judicial salaries and professional 
prestige, judicial office started to be an interesting professional choice again. In the 
second half of 2000s (at the latest), the system came under considerable critique: 
new judicial places were scarce or non-existent and the procedure for selecting new 
judges opaque, non-transparent, and prone to nepotism.35  
 
Today, the greatest problem still lies in the absence of any open, transparent and 
clear criteria according to which new judicial candidates will be picked up by the 
presidents of regional courts, as well as a predictable and common procedure. A 
court president has a great degree of discretion where to look: s/he can propose for 
appointment an excellent judicial trainee/law clerk who has been working at the court 
for a number of years. S/he can, however also suggest a local attorney, a state 
prosecutor, or whomever else who has passed the necessary examination and has 
the required length of practice. Needless to say that such unfettered discretion is 
problematic. It leaves an immense amount of discretion in the hands of presidents of 
courts, who, in extreme cases, if they secure the consent of the Ministry of Justice, 
are in the position to appoint whomever they propose, as it is rare that the 
government or the president of the republic would question the appointment of the 
selected candidates selected and proposed by the Ministry of Justice.  
 
In the past years, the more open and progressive presidents of courts started filling 
up places within their districts on the basis of an open competition. However, this is 
just a practice established by some presidents and not necessarily followed by all of 
them. Furthermore, even if there is an open competition, the criteria according to 
which the judicial vacancy would be filled may not be spelled out entirely. Even if they 
are, they are likely to differ from a region to a region, as all this is the individual 
initiative of some court presidents. At the same time, there are also judicial vacancies 
in the circuit of some regional courts that would be filled without any open 
competition.  
 
The situation is very unsatisfactory. It has been universally criticized from all 
quarters, judicial, academic, as well as by the public at large. In 2000, the Czech 
Parliament rejected the idea of creating a Supreme Council of Judiciary.36 In 
retrospect, seeing the way in which a number of judicial councils created in the EU 
pre-accession wave in Central and Eastern European countries have evolved, this 
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might have been a blessing in disguise.37 Selection and training of new judges has 
been, however, one of the competences that were to be assigned to the 
contemplated Supreme Council of Judiciary. Since then, the judicial selection 
process and its potential reform found itself in a sort of limbo. The status quo has 
been maintained, as there appears to be too many conflicting interests at stake which 
have prevented any reform so far. On the one hand, the Ministry of Justice would 
wish to centralize the selection process, to which the presidents of courts do not 
agree. On the other hand, ordinary judges would like the competence to pass on to 
some sort of judicial self-government of self-representation, which is universally 
rejected by all the political parties. The presidents of courts might be content with the 
status quo, which gives them considerable and decisive say in judicial selection and 
appointments.  
 
The unsatisfactory state of judicial selections naturally contributes to the public 
dissatisfaction with the judiciary as such. If judicial office is perceived as something 
granted and controlled by a narrow clique of judicial officials, this certainly does not 
help fostering the idea that the best lawyers become judges. It naturally also 
undermines any idea of merit, unless “merit” would be defined by the excellent 
technical knowledge of the law and equally excellent acquaintance with a court 
president. It ought to be stressed that the actual results of the selection appear to be 
decent in most cases, at least to an interested professional. The point made here is, 
however, how the process appears to the outside world, even if it may get it right in 
(hopefully) most cases.  
 
Finally, as may appear already from the description given, the ideas that judicial 
appointments should in any way reflect the diversity of the community are not really 
mirrored in the Czech practice. Equally, there is no direct involvement of lay 
members (non-judges) in the initial stages of the judicial selections. On the other 
hand, if politicians are to be understood as “lay-persons”, they are at least somewhat 
involved later in the appointment process: the Ministry of Justice has to approve the 
list of candidates which is then passed on to the government. This role of non-judicial 
element in the selection is, however, limited to a type of very rarely exercise veto 
power over nominations made by the judiciary, not any genuine lay-participation in 
the selection itself. In sum, the entire section process runs apart from the community 
and without much of non-judicial participation.  
 
4. Lay Participation in the Judicial Decision-Making Process 
 
Lay participation38 in the judicial decision-making process in the Czech Republic has 
rich history, questionable presence, and uncertain future. The rich history goes back 
to the periods of Austria-Hungary (before 1918) and the so-called ‘first’ Czechoslovak 
Republic (1918-1939), where lay participation in the judicial decision-making played a 
significant role. The idea and also the practice of lay-participation was, however, 
subsequently discredited under the Communist rule, during which “lay-participation” 
was used as the tool of the “popular control” of courts. Since 1989, the trend has 
been to push out the remnants of lay participation in judicial decision-making, today 
limited to just first instance decision-making in some labour law and criminal cases, 
out of the judicial system altogether.  
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 As in most of the post-Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the establishment of 
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 Throughout this section, with the exception of point 3.4., “lay participants” are understood as persons 
without a university degree in law, i.e. persons not being lawyers.  
4.1. Historical Roots 
 
Before 1948, i.e. the Communist take-over in Czechoslovakia, lay-participation in 
judicial decision-making was an important element of the gradual democratization of 
formerly absolutist Austrian monarchy. Most forms of lay participation appeared after 
1867 with the new, liberal Austrian constitution. There were two forms of lay 
participation: 
(i) jury; 
(ii) lay-judges.  
 
Trial by the jury of one’s peers was one of the liberalisation demands since 1848 in 
Austria. Trial by jury was first introduced in 1869 for press cases (libel).39 In 1873, a 
general law on juries was adopted, expanding trial by jury to all serious criminal 
cases.40 The 1873 form of jury trial was later taken over by the Czechoslovak 
Republic after 1918, with just minor modifications.41  
 
Jury was composed of 12 members. Eligible to sit on the jury was any regular citizen 
with at least one year of residence in the community in question, who has reached 35 
years of age, was literate, and paid taxes on his own income. Citizens eligible to sit 
on the jury were selected from the register of voters each year and put into the 
annual jury list. From this annul jury list, the jury members for each individual case 
were selected randomly – by a lot.  
 
The second form of lay participation in Austria and later in Czechoslovakia were lay-
judges. A lay-judge sat together with a professional judge. He would be a full 
member of the judicial panel, entitled to ask questions, and vote with the professional 
judge(s). The office of lay-judge was created gradually in the last third of the 19th 
century for specific areas of judicial decision-making: work and labour;42 press and 
censorship;43 juvenile criminal justice;44 mining, trade, and shipping law.45 In all these 
areas, lay judges sat together with professional judges. Their numbers in the judicial 
panel differed, according to the area and the reason behind the introduction of lay 
participation. In labour disputes, where the driving idea appeared to be social justice 
and representation, a three member judicial panel was composed of a professional 
judge presiding and one lay judge nominated by the employers and another one by 
the employees. In matters of press and censorship, the driving idea was one of public 
control: thus, a five member panel was composed of three professional judges and 
two lay judges, selected from the public. In matters of juvenile justice and mining, 
                                                          
39
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vom 1. Juni 1897 über die Ernennung der fachmännischen Laienrichter aus dem Kreise der 
Bergbaukundigen, RGsBl. 128/1897, and Verordnung der Minister der Justiz und des Handels vom 1. 
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trade, shipping cases, the driven idea was the external expertise of the lay judges 
qua professionals in their area of expertise or trade to be brought into the dispute 
resolution. Thus, the panels were composed half-half, or even, in some mining or 
shipping cases, the lay judge who was called as a recognised expert in the matter for 
a certain period of time, could even sit alone.  
 
This rich Austrian and Czechoslovak tradition of lay participation in judicial decision-
making was abruptly changed in 1948, soon after the Communist take-over. Law no 
319/1948 Coll. that introduced the sweeping changes was called “Act on 
Popularisation of Justice”. It brought about unprecedented lay participation in judicial 
decision-making: lay judges (then called “Judges from the People”) had majority in all 
instances of judicial decision. In first instance cases, the panels were composed 
according to the formula 1 + 2; at the appellate and supreme level, the formula was 2 
+ 3. One or two professional judge(s), who were always presiding judges, sat 
together with two or three lay judges. All of them had one vote, i.e. the professional 
judge(s) could be outvoted by the lay members of the panel.46  
 
The motives for such sweeping introduction of non-professionals into the judicial 
systems had, however, very little to do with community representation, unless the 
relevant “community” were not the members of the Communist party. It was a tool of 
control of the Communist party over the judicial system; needless to say that “Judges 
from the People” were carefully selected by the Communist Party. § 11 of the Law no 
319/1948 Coll. even expressly stipulated that only Czechoslovak citizens who can be 
“relied upon by the State and have given themselves fully to the idea of peoples 
democracy” are eligible to sit as lay judges. The then Communist Minister of Justice, 
Mr. Alexej Čepička, openly acknowledged that the extensive “People’s participation” 
in the judicial decision-making was a temporal solution, to be in place until new, 
socialist lawyers and judges have been formed, who could replace the pre-1948 
judges.47 The Communist Party started working on this task immediately after 1948, 
breeding the new Communist lawyers in specialised, dedicated schools running in 
parallel to universities.48  
 
The task of “popularisation” or “democratisation” of the judicial system with the aid of 
“Judges from the People”, or in reality the total control of the judicial system by the 
Communist party, appeared to have been achieved by 1964.49 The new law on 
courts and judges from 196450 reduced the 1 + 2 model to first instance decision-
making at district and regional courts. “Judges from the People” no longer 
participated in any appellate or supreme level decision-making. The model of 1 + 2 
remained, however, the rule in all first instance cases, unless the professional judge 
was sitting alone.  
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4.2. The Post-1989 Uncertainty 
 
Against such historical and ideological background, it is perhaps not surprising that 
the idea of lay participation in judicial decision-making has not found greater support 
when shaping new laws after the fall of the Communist regime in 1989. 
Unfortunately, the new post-1989 legislation only continued the trend already set by 
the Communist regime in 1964. It pushed lay participation out of judicial decision-
making even further.51 Mostly with the arguments of judicial economies and 
procedural efficiency, lay participation gradually became the odd exception, even in 
first instance cases. Today, the remaining areas of lay participation in judicial 
decision-making are first instance labour disputes and some first instance criminal 
cases. In quantitative terms, it would appear that in criminal cases, lay judges sit in 
some 10 to 20 of the total cases heard. Labour law cases would amount to some 
5 of all civil law cases.52  
 
Most recently, further proposals to eliminate the office of lay judges altogether were 
tabled. It was suggested that in the future, judicial decision-making would become 
entirely professional, with all first instance cases decided by a professional judge 
sitting alone. The Ministry of Justice’s proposal to this effect, which was prepared in 
cooperation with presidents of regional and district courts, was, however, rejected by 
the Legislative Council of the Czech Government in March 2011.53 The key reasons 
given for suggesting the abolition of lay participation altogether were as follows:  
 
(i) permanent lack of interest for the work of lay judges, who are not remunerated in 
any reasonable way. The office is thus of little interest to anybody but few retired 
persons; 
(ii) the approach of the few members of the public who can be prevailed upon to sit 
as lay judges is somewhat unreliable, they fail to appear or to properly cooperate and 
this causes delays in proceedings; 
(iii) the participation of lay judges in proceedings (oral hearings) is predominantly 
passive and formal, thus presenting no real contribution; 
(iv) lack of education on the part of lay judges and absence of legal knowledge. The 
judges spend considerable time before and after the hearing explaining the law, case 
law, and the broader problem to the lay judges. 
(v) overall judicial economy: as all the decision in cases when lay judges are sitting 
must be decided by the full panel, including procedural orders and other decisions 
not on merits, this considerably delays judicial proceedings, as the lay judges must 
always be called in, even for minor, non-merit decisions.54  
 
The proposal to abolish lay participation demonstrates the considerable uncertainties 
and ideological fumbling about what lay participation in judicial decision-making 
ought to be and why. On the one hand, there is no doubt that the current participation 
of lay judges in the judicial decision-making is problematic in many respects. The 1 + 
2 model introduced in 1948, with its historical rationale and justification, is clearly a 
                                                          
51
 Starting with zákon č. 335/1991 Sb., o soudech a soudcích and zákon č. 519/1991 Sb., kterým se 
mění a doplňuje občanský soudní řád a notářský řád, ve znění zákona č. 24/1993 Sb. 
52
 Figures are an internal estimate by the Ministry of Justice of 3 March 2011, which were submitted to 
the Legislative Council of the Czech Government together with the proposal mentioned in the 
subsequent footnote (on file with the author).  
53
 At the 73
rd
 sitting of the Legislative Council of the Government of the Czech Republic on 3 March 
2011.  
54
 In: Reasoned Report of the Ministry of Justice accompanying the bill (unpublished, on file with the 
author). The reasons are, however, also largely reproduced in a journal article by D Prouza  M Hájek, 
‘Laický prvek při soudním rozhodování v trestních věcech aneb přísedící ano či ne?’ Trestněprávní 
revue No 7/2010, 201.  
matter of the past. It is also true that low interest and low prestige make lay 
participation difficult and plagued with practical problems outlined above. On the 
other hand, it would be most unfortunate to pick up on these, practical but largely 
technical problems, and on their basis seal off the judicial business completely from 
any lay participation. It is quite apparent that judges, represented by the presidents of 
courts and the Ministry of Justice, would welcome if judicial decision-making were to 
be left to professionals only. However, justice is perhaps too important to be left only 
to professional judges.  
 
In sum, lay participation in judicial decision-making after 1989 finds itself in sort of no 
man’s land. The Communist model of 1+2 has been largely discredited. Its 
continuation out of tradition poses a number of problems. It also faces ideological 
void: what values and principles should this type of lay participation uphold and why? 
What type of legitimacy is it supposed to generate: democratic, representative, 
expertise-derived, social, or other?55 An answer to such ontological, ideological 
questions, once it has been given, could fuel the establishment of a new model of lay 
participation in judicial decision-making in the Czech Republic. This is, however, a 
debate which has yet to happen. The question of lay participation in judicial decision-
making is a somewhat marginal issue that remained for a long time outside of 
political/legal attention. Most of the reforms in the past twenty years in the Czech 
judicial system would focus on the more pressing issues of day to day operation of 
the judicial system, its reform, the requirements flowing from the Accession to the 
European Union, and so on.  
 
4.3. Eligibility and Selection 
 
The current eligibility criteria for lay judges are: 
(i) Czech citizenship; 
(ii) full legal capacity; 
(iii) no criminal record; 
(iv) at least 30 years of age at the date of appointment; 
(v) the candidate must be permanently resident or have the place of work in the 
judicial district with respect to which s/he wishes to be elected; 
(vi) the candidate possesses experience and moral characteristics that guarantee 
due performance of the judicial office.56  
 
Today, lay judges are elected for a (renewable) term of office of 4 years. The 
president of the district/regional court communicates to the respective local/regional 
assembly the number of lay judges that need to be elected for each term of office. 
The number of lay judges needed should be calculated in such a way as to ensure 
that one lay judge does not sit more than 20 days within a calendar year. Any 
member of the local assembly (local authority) may suggest a candidate for the office 
of a lay judge. Lay judges are then elected by the assembly corresponding to the 
level of the respective court: local (municipal) assemblies elect lay judges who are to 
sit at district courts and regional assemblies elect lay judges who are to sit at regional 
courts when the latter decide as criminal courts of first instance.  
 
Once elected by the respective assembly, lay judge swear the same judicial oath as 
professional judges. They become members of a judicial panel and sit with a 
professional judge in the already described 1+2 formation, with the professional 
judge always presiding. However, all three members of the panel have one vote. 
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 For further discussion on these issues see e.g. M Malsch, Democracy in Courts: Lay Participation in 
European Criminal Justice Systems (Ashgate, 2009).  
56
 Conditions are listed in § 60 of the Act no 6/2002 Coll., Law on Courts and Judges. 
Thus, hypothetically, it could happen that the two lay judges outvote the professional 
judge. However, this is a very unlikely scenario, taking into account the huge 
knowledge and standing asymmetry between the professional, permanently sitting 
judge, and a lay person sitting in just few cases in up to 20 days a year.  
 
In practice, the interest and motivation for becoming a lay judge are low. Although 
formally elected by the local assemblies, there is not much of a competition for the 
position. There is no duty to sit as a lay judge. The decision to put one’s name 
forward for election by the local assembly is voluntary. There are no comprehensive 
data as to the social background and composition of the body of lay judges. It would 
nonetheless appear that a typical lay judge is a senior citizen, already retired, who 
does not mind the very low remuneration received for the service.57  
 
4.4. Other Forms of Lay Participation 
 
The discussion in this section so far understood “lay participation” as participation of 
non-lawyers by education in the judicial decision-making. It should be mentioned, 
however, that in 2008, a new and particular form of lay participation has been 
introduced with respect to disciplinary proceedings against judges, public 
prosecutors, and later also against court executors.58 It foresees the participation of 
lay judges, who are, however lawyers but not professional judges.  
 
Law no 314/2008 Coll.59 which reformed disciplinary proceedings against judges, 
sought to establish a new balance and new legitimacy for disciplinary proceedings 
against judges in the Czech Republic. Under the previous system, disciplinary courts 
of first instance were specialised panels within the high courts. A specialised 
chamber of the Supreme Court acted as the court of appeal in disciplinary 
proceedings. This system was criticised for its leniency and social irresponsiveness: 
only judges could sanction other judges. Over the years, the outcome of a number of 
problematic cases discredited the entire system.60  
 
The new system sought to involve other legal professionals than judges in the 
decision-making relating to judicial discipline. Special chambers attached to the 
Supreme Administrative Court were created. In matters of judicial discipline, each 
chamber is composed of six members. There are three judicial members of the 
disciplinary panel: a judge of the Supreme Administrative Court as presiding judge; a 
judge from the Supreme Court; and a judge from a lower court. There are also three 
non-judicial members of the panel sitting as “lay judges”: one public prosecutor; one 
advocate; and one legal academic. All members of the disciplinary panel are selected 
randomly by a lot from a list of nominees submitted by their respective institutions, for 
a term of office of 5 years.  
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 Regulation of the Ministry of Justice of 7 January 1992, no 44/1992 Coll., sets the flat fee 
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 Under Czech law, (Court) executor is a natural person that is entitled to perform forced execution of 
enforcement titles (final court judgments, administrative decisions) for a fee.  
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 In detail M Bobek, ‘Odpovědnost a disciplína soudce (v přerodu?)’ Právní rozhledy no 14/2011, 502, 
503-505.  
The new system of disciplinary proceedings thus involved non-professional judges in 
judging judicial discipline. Naturally, the three non-judicial members of the disciplinary 
panel are strictly speaking not “lay persons”: all of them are professionals from other 
legal professions, in most cases with many years of experience and expertise. Giving 
half of the votes in disciplinary panels to persons others than professional, career 
judges, was not welcomed with enthusiasm from within the career judiciary, to say 
the least. It went flatly against decades old traditions of only judges being allowed to 
discipline other judges.61 The very idea that other legal professions might participate 
in disciplining judges was considered by some outright unconstitutional. With the first 
five years term of office of the first disciplinary panels already passed, it appears that 
it might be more the political forces and general public, longing for “judicial blood”, 
that are dissatisfied with the “outcomes”. The disciplinary sanctions imposed and 
severity do not differ that much from the previous disciplinary practice. What differs 
considerably, however, is the degree of inclusion and co-decision of the 
representatives of other legal professions, which makes any claims of “intra-judicial-
brotherhood-leniency” being raised against the new system of disciplinary 
proceedings difficult.  
 
There are currently no other forms of direct lay participation in the judicial decision-
making in the Czech Republic. With respect to the two additional questions that were 
raised by the general reporter: there is (extensive) use of experts (i.e. expert 
witnesses) in judicial proceedings. Indeed, rightly or not, a number of judicial 
proceedings in the Czech Republic today might be aptly described as battles of 
expert opinions. Expert opinions might be requested by the court or submitted by the 
parties to the dispute. However, even if requested by a court on a non-legal, 
technical matter, an expert opinion can hardly be classified as lay participation in 
judicial decision-making. There will certainly be some influence exercised by the 
expert opinion on the judicial mind. The judge nonetheless hears and evaluates the 
information and knowledge received from the expert witness as any other evidence 
submitted to the court in the course of judicial proceedings.  
 
Jury trials have not been used since 1948 in Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic, 
when the already cited Law no 319/1948 Coll., Act on Popularisation of Justice, 
abolished any remnants of the old Austrian/First Czechoslovak Republic trial by jury. 
There is also no serious debate as to their re-introduction today. From the experience 
of other civilian countries, with their system of criminal justice also based on the more 
inquisitorial model, it would appear that it would be difficult or even ill-advised to seek 
re-inserting trial by jury into the system of criminal justice in a civilian country.62  
 
5. Conclusions: Judicial Legitimacy and Lay Participation 
 
The Czech judiciary does not score well on either of the two principal issues relating 
to lay participation addressed in this questionnaire: judicial selection and judicial 
decision-making. The picture emerging is one of detached, insulated judiciary. A 
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 Going back as far as 1868 to the first Austrian codification on the matter, which introduced the model 
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RGBl. 46/1868. 
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 Cf. e.g. the experience of Spain or Russia that sought to (re)introduced trial by jury in the last two 
decades and which can be said to be problematic – further see N Vidmar (ed.), World Jury Systems 
(Oxford University Press, 2000) 319-351 or also Malsch (n 55) 52-53. 
judiciary that does not trust the people much and, correspondingly, not that many 
people trust the courts.63 
 
More than twenty years after the regime change in 1989, the Czech legal system has 
still to identify a useful and reasonable model of lay participation in the administration 
of justice. The old models have been largely outdated and/or discredited under the 
Communist rule. Far too often “lay participation” was equated with “Popular Justice”, 
which was nothing else than a codename for the Communist control of the judiciary. 
The perhaps natural reaction after 1989 was therefore to take the opposite course: to 
cut the public participation in both, selection of judges as well as judicial decision-
making, to a minimum, and to opt for a fully professional judiciary.  
 
The logic of any legal revolution based on value discontinuity with the previous 
regime tends to be dialectic. If the previous regime claimed A, its successor, who 
defines and legitimizes itself by opposition, is bound to claim non-A. It is only with the 
passage of some time that the edges become less sharp and a more nuanced 
discussion may take place. Thus, only with the passage of time may be realised that 
the fact that “lay participation” was misused as a Communist tool for the control of the 
judicial system does not mean that the idea itself must be discredited forever and 
cannot provide legitimacy and a number of practical benefits for the administration of 
a rule of law based judicial system. For that, however, a serious discussion on the 
aims and purposes of lay participation in the judicial system ought to take place, a 
debate which has not yet even started.  
 
A particular problem in potentially designing new models for lay participation in 
judicial selections and decision-making is where to look comparatively for inspiration. 
Often in the area of court administration and justice, inspiration is sought in own 
democratic past: in the period before 1939, in the first Czechoslovak Republic. The 
question is how much such models can still serve as inspiration decades later, in a 
society operating in a very different context. Moreover, such older models tend to 
proceeded from different ideological starting points. For instance, lay participation in 
the liberalizing Austrian Monarchy of late 19th century was driven by the interests of 
public control and expertise sharing. Ideas like social inclusion, community diversity, 
reflection of the society, and, in the end of the day also democracy, were not strongly 
represented, as they did not arise back then.   
 
As already mentioned, the first twenty years after the Velvet Revolution in 1989 were 
mostly spent on what might be called “essential institution building”. Quite 
understandably, looking at the situation in Czech courts in 1990s, the essential and 
basic reforms had to take precedence over more refined issues of lay participation. 
Issues of social inclusion and reflection of the community may also be quickly 
rendered moot if there are no skilled, professional judges who are able to decide in 
reasonable time and in a reasonable quality in an impartial way. However, with such 
first wave of the essential reforms finished, perhaps the time is ripe to start paying 
attention to the finer points of institutional design. Otherwise, the by then professional 
and decently operational judiciary might run the danger of becoming too detached. 
This danger is naturally even stronger in career-based, Continental judiciaries, into 
which judges enter in their late twenties or early thirties and are appointed for life. 
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 Although in contrast to the past, the popular trust into courts has increased considerably within the 
Czech society. In a survey concerning popular trust into institutions of public life, including courts, police, 
army, church, NGOs, press, television, and others, carried out by Sociological Institute of the Czech 
Academy of Science in September 2013, 50 of all respondents expressed their trust into courts (with 
45  expressing their distrust and 5  not knowing). This is a considerable improvement, as in the 
second half of 1990s, the popular trust into courts lied around 25 or 30. In: Důvěra některým institucím 
veřejného života - září 2013, Tisková zpráva PO131004, online at [http://cvvm.soc.cas.cz]. 
With a judge sitting some thirty to forty years on the bench, the dangers of social 
isolation, detachment, and irresponsiveness, are not merely hypothetical. 
 
What precise values or interests should lay participation in judicial selections and/or 
judicial decision-making fulfil in the Czech legal system today is a discussion that is 
still to happen. It is nonetheless clear that deeper involvement of lay persons in 
judicial selection and/or judicial decision-making would also require, in the Czech 
Republic as well as more broadly in the neighbouring Central European countries 
sharing the same mental image of the judicial function, a redefinition of the image of 
judges and their legitimacy. If the judicial legitimacy is derived from technical 
knowledge of the law and its procedures, and judicial legitimacy is technocratic, as 
outlined in the opening of this report, what might be the contribution of lay persons to 
such judicial process? Unless and until this image is redefined and ready to 
acknowledge that judges pass value judgments to which lay persons may contribute 
both with their social experience and/or specific expertise, which in turn generates 
broader popular/diffuse support for the judiciary, then the involvement of lay persons 
in whatever stage of the judicial process will hardly be seen as useful or necessary.  
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